

# Transcript of Brown's Statement and of His News Conference With Gen. Jones

Following is a transcript of the televised news conference held by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at the Pentagon yesterday with Gen. David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC News.

## Opening Statement

I have a short statement, which I will read, and then General Jones and I will answer your questions.

As you know by now, we ordered last night the cancellation of an operation in Iran that was under way to prepare for the rescue of our hostages. The President has already provided the general background. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are prepared to add some more detail.

Let me say at the outset that we can all be proud of the brave men who undertook this mission. They conducted themselves with skill and courage. And we're filled with sorrow for the eight men who gave their lives trying to rescue their fellow Americans.

Let me give you a brief summary of events before we take your questions.

On the late evening and early morning of April 24 and 25, Iran time, approximately 90 U.S. military personnel, together with the air crews, embarked on an operation to prepare for rescue of the U.S. citizens held hostage in Iran.

**Rescue at Refueling Site**

The eight helicopters and associated transport aircraft were en route to a remote landing site, 200 miles from Tehran in the Iranian desert, that was to be used for refueling — and on that map we've circled in black roughly the area to which I'm referring.

Depending upon the success of that and other steps, a later decision was to have been made as to whether to proceed with the actual rescue attempt.

Because we knew the long and arduous trip would tax the capacity of the helicopters, we added refueling to the mission. We had to be sure that we could continue if some of them became unusable.

Two of the helicopters experienced problems en route. One landed in the desert and its crew was picked up by another helicopter, which then proceeded forward to the refueling point. The second helicopter had difficulties, reversed course, and landed about the carrier Nimitz in the Arabian Sea.

Upon arrival at the desert landing site a third helicopter experienced a severe hydraulic malfunction which put it out of commission.

**Mission Needed Six Coverters**

The operation plan provided for termination of the mission if there were less than six helicopters operational at this point. Therefore, we decided to call off the remainder of the operation and to extract all of the personnel.

As the aircraft were preparing to depart — and this, of course, was in com-

plete darkness — a helicopter and a C-130 aircraft collided. Both immediately caught fire. Eight of our men were killed; four others suffered burns.

To insure the safe evacuation of the rest of the party, the commander on the scene directed his men to leave the helicopters and depart on the remaining C-130's. This left behind the four functioning helicopters, the helicopter that had experienced the hydraulic malfunction and the burning wreckage of one helicopter and one C-130.

No Iranian military forces were encountered at any point during the mission. However, approximately 30 Iranian civilians, who were passing by in a bus at about the time the first C-130 landed, were detained at the site.

When the decision was made to terminate the rescue effort, all the civilians were allowed to depart unharmed.

**Training Was Exhaustive**

As you can see from this description, the mission was complex and difficult. But it was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself that it was operationally feasible. This judgment was reached after a thorough assessment, which included many practice exercises.

Our plan was carefully conceived and the training was exhaustive. The reasons for the possibility of our terminating the operation because of our difficulties, such as mechanical failure or detection by the Iranians of the mission in this troubled region.

The flight to the assembly point and the refueling itself had been carried out with excellent success. To repeat, we concluded, based on established criteria thoroughly considered earlier, that we had to terminate the mission — reduced that chance to the point that dictated ending the mission.

I think you can understand why we felt that we had to do this difficult operation. In our opinion it represented the best course of action for getting our hostages out of Iran expeditiously. And it was also the course that raised the least risk of harming the Iranian people and the least risk of causing instability in this troubled region.

We're disappointed that the mission failed. We're saddened at the loss of our eight fellow Americans. But let me one more time resolve and let me one more time understand the meaning of these events. We will not rest until we have secured the release of the hostages. I'll take your questions.

## Questions and Answers

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Ayatollah just put out a statement saying that there are 10 Americans that were killed and that there are 10 that are still wandering around. Can you confirm or deny any of that?

MR. BROWN. Yes, I can deny it, and I do. A number of statements have come out of there, and it's naturally a time of confusion. I have no knowledge of anything of the kind he's talking about.

Q. How could you have secured the release of the hostages without massive bloodshed, given the fact that there are an estimated 150 armed Iranian militants guarding the embassy?

A. I'm not going to go into the details of any parts of the mission beyond the parts that were actually carried out. I will say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly reviewed this, I reviewed it, and the team itself was convinced that that was the part of the mission of which they were most confident.

**Carriers Played Key Role**

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you fly from Egypt and refuel in Bahrain on your way?

A. We are not going to say anything about other countries. None of the countries, no other country in the entire region, was aware of or informed of the prospect of a rescue operation. We relied heavily on our carrier task force, and I'm not going to go beyond that in saying what the operational details were.

Q. Mr. Brown, these troops were U.S. Army Marines? What units?

A. The team included individuals from each of the four services in the Defense Department. I don't want to go beyond that.

Q. They were volunteers?

A. They all volunteered for the units that they were in.

Q. Can you explain the circumstances leading up to the collision? Was there any reason for extra urgency in getting off the ground?

A. I'll ask General Jones to comment on that. He and I have talked about it, but he's been in more direct contact.

GENERAL JONES. We are still examining the details of what happened in the crash. It was completely dark; they had night-vision devices, but it was unfortunate on the lift-off it appeared that the helicopter struck the C-130 and they were both engulfed in flames.

Q. What sort of helicopter was it?

A. These were RH-53's. They're the big helicopters. These are designed primarily for maritime operations. They've been adapted for special operations of this kind.

Q. Were there civilians or non-Americans?

A. This team that I'm talking about was a Defense Department team from all the services.

Q. Why did you call it so close? It seems to be close — 25 percent error, then you had to cancel the mission. Why weren't more helicopters put into this?

A. We had carried out the exercise in practice in the United States on similar or near-similar terrain and circumstances as we could arrange and had succeeded in having helicopters operate properly. We believed that we could get by with six, and we could have gotten by with six. Originally, we were planning to start with seven, with one spare. Because we recognized that operationally this was the most difficult part of the mission, and this particular component the one that was going to be stressed the most, we added an eighth helicopter before we went ahead. That was really quite considerable. It is difficult to get helicopters out there without revealing what was going on and that was one limit. Even if we had more helicopters, I think at some point adding them just adds to the possibility of additional difficulties. I think, in retrospect, one can of course speculate what would have happened if there were more.

Q. Were the helicopters flown in all the way on their own or were they carried in fixed-wing aircraft, and did they come from the aircraft carriers or from ground bases?


A. We informed a broad spectrum of countries immediately after the operation. Actually, it happened after we had extracted our forces because no one in Iran knew that our forces had been extracted until after they had been extracted. But we then communicated the facts and indicated that this was a rescue operation and not a military action.

Q. How was the final rescue supposed to be effected, sir?

A. I said I will not talk about elements of the operation beyond those that were actually carried out. Yes?

Q. Tell us when the decision was made to go ahead with the operation.

A. Well, the decision to proceed with this sort of an operation and to get — that is, to prepare for a rescue, including movement of forces, movement of aircraft and so on, was made two weeks ago. But the actual decision to effect the rescue would not have been made until today.



Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, aiding Defense Secretary Harold Brown to answer a reporter's question at the Pentagon

A. The helicopters flew from the carrier and they had been carried into the area on shipboard.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Nimitz again? MR. BROWN. They were aboard the Nimitz.

Q. Who was the officer in charge of preparing and checking for mechanical malfunction on the helicopters? And as I understand, you have eight helicopters and three of them malfunctioned?

A. No, I said three of them — no, I said three of them were not functioning after the refueling at the rendezvous point.

Q. Who was responsible for preparing them?

A. Well, I'll take responsibility within the Defense Department. We will, you know, we're examining what happened in detail. This operation was just terminated yesterday and it is going to be thoroughly and exhaustively considered. I'm not looking for goats.

**Operation Began After Dark**

Q. Could you give us some hours? What time this happened — either our time or their time? And were the C-130s equipped with the fuel to refuel the —

Yes.

Q. Could you repeat the question, sir?

A. And did the C-130's have the filters on them?

A. Well, the question — there are several questions — so that you can hear it. We were asked about the timing of this. The helicopters went and the C-130's went, across the — entered Iranian airspace shortly after dark. The decision to terminate the mission was made at about a quarter to 5, our time — there's a nine-and-a-half-hour difference and you can figure out what that adds up to, about 3:15, I guess. There are several more questions contained there, but I guess I've forgotten them.

Q. How long were they on the ground?

A. They were — my recollection is that they were on the ground three hours altogether.

Q. Mr. Brown, does this failure rule out any further American military efforts?

A. Well, we're not going to rule out, you know, we're not going to rule out any options, any more than we did before. We're going to do everything we possibly can to release the hostages. And we continue to believe that a peaceful solution is the best solution. We had hoped, of course, that we could do this with minimum force.

**Allies Were Not Notified**

Q. If I may follow that up, do you still have a military option?

A. Yes.

Q. ... Schedules and plans, were the Soviet — were the Communists informed of this either before, during or immediately after the operation?

A. We informed a broad spectrum of countries immediately after the operation. Actually, it happened after we had extracted our forces because no one in Iran knew that our forces had been extracted until after they had been extracted. But we then communicated the facts and indicated that this was a rescue operation and not a military action.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, could you help us out on...

Q. ... Of sequence. Why was this operation undertaken at this time when it, in effect, pulls the rug out from the effort to get allied sanctions? And can you identify the dead men?

A. We will identify the dead after their next of kin have been notified and not before. We expect that it will happen today and then we will make identification.

**Other Perils Spurred Mission**

Q. Why did you go ahead now?

A. All diplomatic efforts, so far, had failed and this had been going on for six months. There was no reason to believe that six hostages would be released at any time in the foreseeable future. Various times had been mentioned, you'll recall: May, June, July, the end of the year, and indefinitely.

There was a danger posed to the hostages by the deteriorating security situation in Iran. There is clearly an armed conflict of — across the border between Iran and Iraq, for example. There is, as those of you who've watched television lately are aware, considerable disorder in the streets in Iran.

We have considered, as you know, such things as interrupting commerce, militarily — there are obvious complications with that. It internationalizes the conflict, widens it, and might or might not have the desired effect.

The crisis has been heightening tensions in what is already a volatile and vital region. There's a need to resolve that crisis. We need to remove a situation that complicates relationships among friends and allies. And the President and his senior defense advisers, military and civilian, concluded that the rescue operation was a sound and feasible plan.

**Planners Considered the Weather**

We have considered concern for the physical and psychological effects on the hostages of prolonged captivity. All these are reasons for going ahead.

The question is: Why didn't we wait awhile? And the answer to that is largely operational. As time goes on in the region, temperature — physical temperature that is — rises, the operations get more difficult, the nights get shorter and all of that made it necessary to move relatively quickly if we were going to move at all during the next many months.

I want to say again that the courage and dedication of the members of this team really deserve, and I know will get, the support and the gratitude of all Americans. They trained well, they were professional and they were dedicated — they are dedicated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said the decision to move airplanes and troops forward and prepare for a rescue was made two weeks ago?

A. Essentially. The decision that we would make a serious attempt to prepare the rescue was made about then.

**No Firm Date Was Selected**

Q. Did that decision, at that time, include the date that you might undertake the rescue?

A. That was going to depend upon weather; it was going to depend upon how fast we could move things, and so the — you know, there was an earliest date but not a firm date.

Q. We're having trouble with the question, sir, could you repeat the question?

A. Well, I think maybe the people who were involved should ask them more loudly.

Q. To follow up on that, Mr. Secretary, you talked about exercising, planning and preparing for this with — in

desert conditions, etc., and yet you've only had two weeks — did this all occur in this two-week period?

A. No, no, no. The training — the planning and training has been going on since November. The question was when was the decision made to move forward actively with preparations of this kind that I've mentioned.

Q. How did you prepare the carrier Nimitz?

**Comparison With Other Missions**

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you compare this operation with the successful operations carried out by the Germans and Israelis? Why can they do it and we can't?

A. Well, Iran is not Entebbe. That's one reason. I'm not sure how many of you have flown 500 nautical miles on a helicopter in one trip, but not many people have. It's a difficult task. And no other country, in my judgment, could have attempted anything like this during this mission.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you help me out on this quote by Secretary of the Air Force Hans Mark, who said that they looked at this plan you just attempted and, quote, "It just wasn't feasible." This was something he said in Biloidi, Miss., April 4. And my question...

A. Did he say that he looked at this plan we attempted?

A. Well, he said that a helicopter...

Q. "The United States considered landing a helicopter at its embassy compound in Teheran to free the American hostages but rejected the idea because it quote 'just wasn't feasible in an urban area.'"

A. Well, I think that the plan that is described in that quotation would be very difficult. I have not described that plan. And I've not described our plan. Q. Who commanded the operation and where did the training take place?

A. I don't think we want to identify that yet, but we will be.

Q. When?

A. We will be telling more about some of the people in a little while.

**Carter Made Ultimate Decision**

Q. Was it under the ultimate command of the President?

A. It was his ultimate decision.

Q. Did you report that the whole thing was...

A. The ultimate decisions, as the President said, are his responsibility and he takes responsibility for them. But the commander of the task force reported to General Jones, who reported to me, who reported to the President.

Q. What was the scene in the White House last night?

A. Excuse me?

Q. What was the scene in the White House last night?

A. A number of people were working very hard and we were very busy at it.

Q. How many people, worldwide, were involved in this?

Q. If you could describe this as a rescue operation when it wasn't really a — you've tried to...

A. It was not an attack on Iran in any way.

Q. Right. Except that it would have been if you'd gone in. You would've confronted Iranians. You also expressed concern about the tensions in the region.

A. Yes.

**No Speculation on Armed Clash**

Q. How come you don't think the tensions would have — would not have risen if you'd been confronting, probably killing Iranians?

A. Yeah, it is. I think, not fruitful to speculate about the — how a successful rescue would have affected things in the region. I am convinced that a suc-

cessful rescue would have affected them favorably.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've said, as I understand it, the planning and training on this has been going on since November. This was ordered by President Carter, this planning and training —

A. Oh, yes.

Q. I see. This was at the same time he was telling the American people that there would be no military action?

A. I again want to characterize this as a rescue operation, as I would characterize any attempt to rescue hostages.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were the personnel, as described in some reports as dressed in some sort of Iranian garb?

A. No.

**Iranians Did Not Detect Mission**

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have any sense that you had been detected by Iranian military forces at any time during this mission?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have any radio communications between the operation and the White House last night?

A. There were communications between the task force and the Pentagon, and there were separate communications between the Pentagon and the White House.

Q. How many people were involved on the ground in Iran and how many worldwide, do you have a figure for?

A. Well, I think, as I said, they were on the order of 90 in the rescue force, there were perhaps a comparable number of air crews and support personnel involved there, and how many worldwide is a much more difficult question because you'd have to include all the carrier personnel, although they were not all directly involved, and so on. I think probably several times that number.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States still have a viable military option to get the hostages out?

A. I am not going to talk about specific options. I'm saying, and I've said and I'll repeat, we continue to keep all our options open. We want to settle this peacefully if we possibly can.

**Iranian Markings Not Used**

Q. Did any of these planes carry Iranian markings, Mr. Secretary?

A. No.

Q. How many C-130's were there, sir?

A. There were six C-130's.

Q. Was the Strategic Air Command warned of this ahead of time, and were the hostages aware that it was coming?

A. No, neither the hostages nor the militants who are holding them hostage were aware. And the Strategic Air Command was not put on higher alert.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us where the force is located now, where it's fallen back?

A. No, it has been extracted from Iran and it is on its way back.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if anyone visits this site before the actual landing? Was there a team that went there first?

A. We knew from photography and other methods that the site was a suit desert very similar to many areas in the southwestern United States on some of which the team had practiced. So that we knew it was suitable, and indeed it proved to be.

Q. There was no advanced party, though.

**Bodies Were Left Behind**

Q. Will the bodies of the servicemen be returned also?

A. The bodies of the dead have not yet been returned. During the extraction, it was concluded that the mission would be jeopardized if an attempt had to be made to recover them. But other efforts are being made — diplomatic efforts are under way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were any of our NATO allies notified beforehand, and, if not, why not?

A. The secrecy of this, the secrecy of this mission would have been compromised by informing others about what we were in the process of doing. Secrecy was vital to avoiding alerting of the Iranians to it. And in the event secrecy was preserved, and it was preserved by confining knowledge to a very, very small group of people — only those who had an absolutely essential part in the preparations, even within the Defense Department. And even they knew even the minimum necessary to carry out their duties. And for that reason, I can't say how many people because different people knew different numbers.

I'm going to take one more question and then I have to go.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can you say that you are not going to rule out any options, no more than you did before, when in fact you have just blown one of your options and you couldn't conceivably attempt it again?

A. Well, I will just repeat what I said: We have not ruled out any option, and we want still to resolve this as peacefully as we can.

Thank you very much.

The aircraft carrier Nimitz. According to officials, helicopters that took part in the raid into Iran were launched from the ship somewhere in the Arabian Sea.

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Navy RH-53 helicopters, of the type used in the aborted rescue mission, being loaded onto a military C-5A transport last November in Norfolk, Va.

## Hostage Rescue Mission: Meticulous and Bold Plans Foiled by Bad Luck

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and Nevada, similar to the terrain the forces would encounter in Iran, according to officials.

In December and January, as the hostage crisis deepened, training became more specific, focused on actual segments of the rescue plan. Long-distance flights by RH-53 helicopters were run, for example, to test the aircraft for the more than 500-mile flight from the carrier into Iran before refueling, officials said.

Helicopters and C-130 transports were flown to the desert regions of the United States and tested for landings and take-offs on the salt flats of Utah.

During this period, officials said, American intelligence operatives started to slip into Iran to prepare for an assault on the embassy.

By late January, officials added, planning and training for a rescue mission had reached an advanced stage and had become a feasible option.

According to White House officials, President Carter decided on April 11, a Friday, to go ahead with the rescue operation after he had announced sanctions against Iran and warned that military action might be the next step if the hostages were not released.

On the following Monday, Mr. Carter issued the order to go ahead with the rescue plan.

### Destination: A Salt Desert

By then, maneuvers were under way in the Indian Ocean designed to disguise the actual operation once it started. American transport planes were flown through Egypt and Oman so such flights would appear routine. Aircraft carriers conducted exercises to evade Soviet vessels in the area, also designed to make aspects of the rescue effort appear to be routine, officials said.

By yesterday, everything appeared to be in place for the rescue, officials said. The final order to begin was given.

The eight RH-53 helicopters, stationed on the carrier Nimitz off the Iranian coast, took off for Iran with about 120 men

aboard. Their destination was the Dasht-e-Kavir salt desert in eastern Iran, near the town of Posht-i-Badan.

One of the helicopters was forced to turn back because of mechanical problems. Mechanical failures forced a second to land short of the destination. Its crew and troops were picked up by another helicopter continuing on to the salt flats, according to Secretary Brown.

The helicopter fleet, which now numbered six, leaving no margin for further breakdowns, made a rendezvous in the desert with six C-130s which had flown in from staging areas in the Middle East, including Egypt, according to officials.

The plan called for the helicopters to refuel, and then fly on to "nest" overnight in the mountains near Teheran. After the refueling operation, the C-130s were supposed to fly to another remote desert location in western Iran, where they would wait for the helicopters to arrive with the freed hostages today, plus the intelligence operatives who had aided the mission on the ground in Teheran, according to senior officials.

### Busload of Iranians Shows Up

These plans began to unravel almost as soon as the first aircraft landed Thursday night. The first unexpected problem was the presence of a busload of 50 Iranians driving across the salt flats on a road called Yezd and Tabas, two towns in the area.

These Iranians were seized by the troops and detained during the refueling operation. Had the mission proceeded, officials said, the Iranians would probably have been flown out of Iran aboard a C-130 and returned after the completion of the rescue. This would have prevented them from alerting Iranian authorities to the presence of foreign forces in Iran, officials said.

American officials said that disorganization and decay in Iran's military made

it possible for the American forces to land in the country without detection. They said that intelligence reports indicated that the helicopters could have flown on to Teheran without detection until they appeared in the sky over the city.

### Too Few Helicopters for Success

While refueling was under way, officials said, yet another helicopter suffered mechanical failure. This was the third breakdown, and it left the rescue mission with only five operational helicopters, one less than the minimum the planners had established.

This was reported to Washington, where Secretary Brown and top military officials decided to call off the effort. They ordered the planes and helicopters to return to their bases.

The Iranians were released. Then, as the transports and helicopters prepared to take off, one of the helicopters collided with a C-130, according to officials. Both craft were immediately engulfed in flames, killing eight aboard and injuring four.

The rescue team, which had been on the ground for about three hours, abandoned the helicopters and boarded the five remaining C-130s.

Iranians who saw the landing were quoted by Tehran authorities as having said that the rescue team had left behind "hundreds" of people. They also asserted that numerous members of the American unit spoke fluent Persian, suggesting the involvement of Iranians in the operation.

Defense Secretary Brown denied that any members of the rescue team had been left behind. He said that the eight bodies could not be recovered without risk to the survivors.

Other officials said that support forces for the mission included some Iranian troops recruited because of their knowledge of the Persian language and the country.

## Nixon Endorses Rescue Attempt

Special to The New York Times

WEST BERLIN, April 25 — Former President Richard M. Nixon gave his support today to President Carter's decision to attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran.

Mr. Nixon, who is visiting Berlin to promote the German-language edition of his new book, "The Real War," said the captives were undergoing "mental and emotional abuse" that had to be ended.

"I certainly support what President Carter did in making his decision to try to rescue the hostages," he told reporters.

The former President called on America's allies to rally behind it and maintain economic sanctions against Iran until the hostages are freed. He said that he favored a solution "short of military action" but that "the President has the responsibility to try a rescue operation" if all else fails.

He also said he had reluctantly concluded that it was necessary for the United States to reintroduce the draft in peacetime "so we do not have to have a wartime draft."

## Long Day and Long Night for Carter

Associated Press

WASHINGTON, April 25 — In the aftermath of the unsuccessful effort to rescue the American hostages in Teheran, the Carter Administration appears to have little choice but to pursue its policy of "turning the screws" on Iran through concerted international economic and political sanctions.

President Carter admitted as much in the last sentence of his television speech this morning when he said the United States and its allies would seek "a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and thereby aiding the hostages."

And while as a technical matter all options were still open, the White House said that it intended to proceed almost as though the rescue operation never occurred.

The sanctions announced by the President on April 17 will be put into effect, and the allies will be called upon to carry on with the two-stage program of diplomatic and economic measures announced this week. A mid-May assessment of the situation is still planned. Earlier, President Carter said he would then weigh additional steps, including military action.

Richard M. Nixon reacting to the news yesterday in West Berlin.

## Long Day and Long Night for Carter

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caused by several factors, officials said.

"We wanted to allow a maximum amount of time to make sure everybody was out," said an Administration official, who added that there was a countervailing pressure to disseminate news of the mission, lest misinformation cause people in Iran or Europe or the United States to react adversely.

Throughout the mission, the White House had what in effect was continuous contact with the operation at "Desert One," the site of the rescue operation 200 miles from Teheran.

But Mr. Carter, who had the capacity at the White House to talk directly with the commander of the mission in Iran, chose instead to let information be sent and received at the command center at the Pentagon by Secretary Brown and Gen. David C. Jones Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### Terse Exchanges

The exchanges, said one official, "did not amount to a great deal of chatter" but simply terse information back and forth on the status of the operation. "The President did not want people to be distracted and serve as play-by-play color announcers," an official said.

But there were several moments of high drama and even grim humor during the course of the long day, officials recalled.

In the early part of the mission, as the helicopters flew through the desert night to their destination, word was received that one helicopter had been forced to land in a sandstorm for 30 minutes. The President marveled at the bravery of its pilot, who waited on the ground alone for the storm to pass.

"If ever there was a guy who had an excuse to turn back, it was that one," Mr. Carter told his aides. "But he went on."

### Bus Laden With Iranians

At about 3:15 P.M., the White House got word on the appearance of a bus laden with about 50 Iranians, whom the raiders stopped and interrogated. This was also a point at which the President became aware that the mission, but he and his aides were advised that the Iranians would pose no harm, and it went ahead.

## Washington's Options Now

## U.S. Expected to Continue 'Turning the Screws' On Iran With Economic and Political Sanctions

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

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### Messages to Allied Leaders

In the interval, the Administration has been using the occasion to relay the allies that they were not being duped and that the American drive for concerted sanctions was and is a legitimate course of action, entirely separate from the rescue effort. Mr. Carter made this point in messages that went out to allied leaders early today, and it was repeated at a State Department briefing for allied ambassadors this afternoon.

The whole process of economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran is a real, genuine and separate track that we intend to pursue," the official said. "And we expect our friends and allies to continue down the path that they have started."

Later, the same official said in private that there was "no tendency to be apologetic" to the allies about the rescue mission, despite the lack of advance consultation. If anything, he said, the operation should underscore to allies and Iranians alike the American determination to get the hostages back.

Direct military action against Iran is

still an option in the Administration view, but the chances of a successful rescue effort have been all but eliminated. At least in the short term, it would be virtually impossible to achieve surprise. Officials also assume that the militants will move the hostages to new locations in Teheran or take other steps to conceal their whereabouts to frustrate another attempt.

The military options all have severe drawbacks as well. Defense Secretary Harold Brown noted this today when he observed that a blockade of Iran's sea routes or mining of its harbors would tend to internationalize the crisis without directly aiding the hostages.

Sanctions, therefore, remain the only really viable option now, even though Administration officials have no illusions about their short-term effectiveness. "It's a choice between sanctions and nothing," a White House aide said, "and nothing is not a policy."

Along with a sense of disappointment, there was concern at the White House today that the bungled rescue effort could be another step in pushing Iran toward the Soviet Union. A tenuous Moscow-Teheran connection was developing before the operation as a result of the American and allied moves to isolate Iran, and officials feared today's developments might encourage it.

### Soviet Reacts Quickly

The Soviet Union attempted to capitalize on the situation with a prompt and categorical statement that it was a news agency, denouncing the rescue attempt as an "armed provocation against Iran."

Nevertheless, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's adviser for national security, has been arguing that the continuing unrest and deterioration of the situation inside Iran pose the greatest threat of a pro-Moscow takeover by leftists. A successful rescue operation would have led to reopening Iran's communication with the West, in this view, and would have done more than anything else to stem Teheran's drift toward the Soviet bloc.

Politically, White House officials expect Mr. Carter to enjoy a short-term and probably temporary boost as a result of the operation, despite the outcome. This has been the pattern in the past when Presidents have ordered bold action, even when the results have been questionable. Former President Gerald R. Ford's popularity jumped after the 1975 operation to rescue the crew of the American merchant ship Mayaguez in Cambodia, for instance, even though as many men were lost as rescued.

But the officials also realize that sharp questions will be posed about the wisdom of the operation, its timing and execution. The honeymoon won't last very long, one official said.

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The Brookdale Hospital Medical Center will make available, upon request, care to patients who are unable to pay for the services of the hospital. These services will be provided in the following manner:

- The hospital will make available uncompensated services on a first request basis.
- These services will only be available to the Ambulatory Care Center.
- Any person seeking uncompensated services on behalf of himself or another person is to make such a request to the Registration Office of the Center within 4 weeks of the date of admission, and that an application be made for Medicaid or Medicare assistance.
- The hospital reserves the right to demand verification of family income, and that an application be made for Medicaid or Medicare assistance.
- The criteria for eligibility for uncompensated care is the PCA Poverty Income Guidelines. Persons whose family income is below the poverty guidelines will be eligible for uncompensated services at no charge upon their request, and if they are not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare. Persons whose income is above the poverty guidelines, but less than twice the guideline, will be eligible for uncompensated services on a reduced fee basis as follows:

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Family Size	AA \$12	BB \$19	CC \$28	DD \$33
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2	4500	5000	5500	6000
3	5000	5500	6000	6500
4	5500	6000	6500	7000
5	6000	6500	7000	7500
6	6500	7000	7500	8000
7	7000	7500	8000	8500
8	7500	8000	8500	9000

Persons residing in obtaining additional information about these services should write or call:

Assistant Director  
Ambulatory Care Center  
The Brookdale Hospital Medical Center  
1110 Avenue C  
Brooklyn, New York 11212  
(212) 550-0203

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